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et al.: Scope and Coverage of Article 9

SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF ARTICLE 9
I. Scorrn oF AnRior

9

The overall purpose of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code is to provide a simplified set of rules governing chattel
security which also meet the needs of today's commercial society.1
In as much as the purpose of Article 9 relates to chattel security,
its scope and coverage is limited to chattel financing.
Article 9 of the Code is divided into four primary areas. First,
it deals with the security transaction and the creation of the
security interest. Basically, this comprehends an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance
of an obligation. Once the security interest is created, Article 9
shifts its attention to the perfection of this security interest
against the claims of third parties. The natural progression after
the perfection of the security interest is the determination of
which party has priority in the security. Finally, the fourth
area regulated by Article 9 is the liquidation of the collateral
when the debtor is in default.
Because Article 9 coverage is limited to the general area of
chattel financing, it is important to outline the particular types
of transactions which are within the scope of the Article. Section 9-102 of the Code outlines the "Policy and Scope of
Article":
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-103 on
multiple state transactions and in Section 9-101 on excluded
transactions, this Article applies so far as concerns any
personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of
this state
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which
is intended to create a security interest in personal
property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or
contract rights; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel
paper.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by
contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage,
chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, con1.S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-102(2)

(1966).
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ditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security. This
Article does not apply to statutory liens except as provided
in Section 9-310.
(3) The application of this Article to a security interest
in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the
obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to
which this Article does not apply.2
The broad sweep of this coverage is intended to extend to all
consensual security interests in personal property and fixtures
unless the transaction is excluded by the application of South
Carolina Code Sections 10.9-103 and 10.9-104. To appreciate the
coverage of Article 9 it is necessary to examine the exclusions.
Article 9 coverage does not apply to mortgages or liens on
real property. 3 Furthermore, it does not apply to "security interests subject to any statute of the United States . . . to the

extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and
third parties affected by transactions in particular types of
property."4 However, as will be discussed later, this provision
is to be distinguished from the provision of section 10.9-302 of
the Code which discusses the effect of a national filing system.
Article 9 does not apply to landlord's liens, the transfer of a
claim for wages, salary or other types of compensation of an
employee, to an equipment trust covering railway rolling stock,
to a transfer of an interest or claim in or under any policy of
insurance or to any right of set-off.5
Although Article 9 does classify the sale of accounts, contract
rights or chattel paper as security transactions," it does not apply
if the sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper is part of
"a sale of the business out of which they arose, or as an assignment of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper which is for
the purpose of collection only, or a transfer of a contract right
to an assignee who is also to do the performance under the
contract."7 These particular transactions are essentially transfers which have nothing to do with chattel financing.
2. Id. § 10.9-102.
3.Id. § 10.9-104(j).
4. Id. § 10.9-104(a).
5. Id. § 10.9-104.
6. Id. § 10.9-102.
7. Id. § 10.9-104(f).
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Article 9 does not cover the transfer of a tort claim, any deposit, savings, passbook or like account in a bank, savings and
loan institution, credit union or other like organization.8
The general application of Article 9 is easily understood by
a reading of the Code sections. However, there are several areas
in which there are serious questions as to Article 9 coverage. The
Code does not make it clear whether subordination agreements,
suretyships, or some leasing agreements which have an option to
purchase are security transactions which require an application
of the provisions of Article 9. Since these areas of commercial
financing represent a vast quantity of transactions and large
monetary investments, a more thorough analysis of their place
within the provisions of Article 9 is required.
II. Qus oAi
A. S

CovzmuG

UNDE

ARTic

9

oulrdination Agreements

A subordination agreement is a contract which gives one
creditor, known as the senior creditor, priority over another
creditor, known as the junior creditor or subordinator, of a
common debtor.9 The use of subordination agreements is recognized and approved by the Uniform Commercial Code. 10 However, the drafters of the Code did not envision the problems
arising from the use of these agreements. No recognition per"se
was given to the legal effect of such agreements or to the rights
and duties created by such an agreement."
The basic problem surrounding the use of subordination agreements is whether the typical subordination agreement creates a
"security interest" in the junior creditor. Section 10.1-201 (37)
of the South Carolina Code, defines a security interest as "an
interest in personal property.., which secures performance of
an obligation."1 2 If it is the intended result that the transaction
create a "security interest", then it is essential for the senior
creditor to perfect his "security interest" to be entitled to Article
9 protections.'
There are conflicting opinions as to whether subordination
agreements do in fact create a "security interest." One argument
8. Id. § 10.9-104(k).
9. C. FuNK, BA Ks AND THE U.C.C. 82 (1953).

10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-316 (1966).
11. 2 G. Gn.moPE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL
12. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-201 (37) (1966).

13. 2 G. GII.Omaa, supra note 11,

at

PROPERTY,

994 (1965).

996.
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that a subordination agreement creates a "security interest" in
the junior creditor is that the junior creditor has certain rights
and privileges against the debtor which come into existence when
the debt is created. By subordinating these rights, the junior
creditor is in effect surrendering some of the rights to the senior
creditor. The effect of this surrender is that it gives the senior
creditor more security than he would enjoy if he lacked priority.14 This argument assumes that there was an intention
between the parties to create a security interest. 15 However, it
may be contended that even if the creation of a security interest
is not clearly articulated by the parties, the security interest may
be implied from the facts and the applicable law. 16
There are several arguments to support the position that a
subordination agreement does not create a "security interest"
and, therefore, requires no filing for perfection under the Code.
One of the positions taken is that a "security interest" is created
only where the parties intend to create such by a contractual
agreement. 17 The argument is that the collateral provides the
security and the subordination agreement only provides for
priority.
Another argument is that the creditors do not look to their
transaction as determining the rights in the collateral after
default.' 8 It has been said that the essence of the security transaction is the determination of the rights in the collateral after
default. 19 However, this argument assumes that the subordination agreement ignores the collateral as an essential part of the
subordination transaction. A subordination agreement could
subordinate rights in collateral and, therefore, come well within
the "essence of the security transaction."
A third argument to support the contention that a subordination agreement is not a security transaction is that the typical
subordination agreement does not "fit into the mechanics" of
Article 9.20 There are no provisions in the Code as to what type
of agreement would be filed, who would file the agreement, and
14.

2 COOGAN,

HOGAN,

AND VAGTS,

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

U.C.C. 2368 (1966) (hereinafter cited as COOGAN).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.9-102, 10.9-104 (1966).

UNDER THE

16. COOGAN, supra note 14, at 2368.

17. Id. at 2359.
18. Id. at 2362.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-501 (1966); UNIFolRm ComMECIAL CODE § 9-501,

Comment 1.
20.

COOGAN,

supra note 14, at 2363.
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against whom the agreement would be filed. Furthermore, the
Code makes no provision for the subordinated party when the
common debtor or the junior creditor is in default.
The validity of this argument assumes that the Code drafters
were cognizant of the problem and took affirmative steps to
resolve it. Since Article 9 makes no attempt to answer the
questions raised by subordination agreements and in fact fails to
make mention of their legal significance, other than to approve
their use, this argument may very well have validity.
In the final analysis, the question of whether or not the subordination agreement creates a security interest is a question for
judicial determination. 2 1 At present, no court applying the Uniform Commercial Code to this problem has ruled on the question.
22
However, in Pioneer-CafeteriaFoods, Limited v. Mack, the
court, by implication, found that while a subordination agree23
ment determines priority between the contracting parties, it
does not affect the rights of other creditors where the other
creditors have no notice of the agreement. 24 In that case the
senior creditor had secured a subordination agreement from the
junior creditor in order to have priority over the collateral of the
common debtor. Both the junior creditor and the common debtor
became insolvent and went into bankruptcy. The court found
that as a matter of priority, the senior creditor's rights were
superior to those of the junior creditor because of the subordination agreement. The junior creditor's trustee in bankruptcy had
been awarded a creditor's share in the assets of the common
debtor and the senior creditor was attempting to reach this share
on the theory that he had a priority on the share because of the
subordination agreement. However, since the other creditors had
no notice of the agreement, the senior creditor took as a general
25
creditor of the junior creditor.
The uncertainty in this area has caused the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code to propose an
amendment to the Code to remove the possibility that the rights
of the senior creditor against the subordinator might be held as
a "security interest" governed by Article 9 of the Code:
21. 2 G. GIu 0aE, supra note 11, at 995.

22. 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965).
23. Id. at 723.

24. Id.
25. Id.
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Subordinated Obligations:
An obligation may be issued as subordinated to payment
of another obligation of the person obligated, or a creditor
may subordinate his right to payment of an obligation by
agreement with either the person obligated or another creditor of the person obligated. Such a subordination does not
create a security interest as against either the common debtor
or a subordinated creditor. This section shall be construed
as declaring the law as it existed prior to the enactment of
L 6
2
this section and not as modifying it.

There are several practical aspects of this problem. If the
amendment to the Code is not adopted and if the courts interpret
subordination agreements as creating "security interests" between
the junior and senior creditors then the perfection requirements
of Article 9 will be applicable. In this regard, the junior creditor
may object to the senior creditor's filing a financial statement
since the junior creditor is not an actual debtor of the senior
creditor. The junior creditor may fear that this will cast a
reflection on his own financial condition. 2
Secondly, this problem generally becomes important in the
situation where both the common debtor and the junior creditor
become bankrupt, or at least where the creditors of the junior
creditor are claiming an interest in the debt of the common
debtor. In this situation the contest is between the senior creditor and the junior creditor's trustee in bankruptcy over the assets
28
of the common debtor.
Another practical aspect of the "security interest" problem is
that in many of the areas where subordination agreements are
commonly used, Article 9 is not applicable. For example, if the
creditor's claim is for deferred salary, Article 9 protections
clearly do not apply. 29 If the subordinated debt is represented
by notes or debentures, the security interest must be perfected by
obtaining possession of the "instrument."3 0 Many subordination
agreements are creatures of equity and are clearly outside the
scope of Article 981
26. Proposed Uniform Amendments Uniform Commercial Code § 1-209
(1962).
27. FuNK, supra note 9, at 83.
28. Id.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-104(d) (1966).

30. Id. §§ 10.9-304(1), 10.9-305.
31. COOGANT, supra note 14, at 2359.
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A fourth aspect of the problem is that many financiers feel
that the likelihood of a fellow creditor of the common debtor
becoming insolvent is small. They feel that a contractual pri82
ority between the creditors is sufficient protection.
The need for clarification is evident. The Code's treatment of
future advances and after-acquired property will give rise to an
increased demand by creditors that the claims of other creditors
be subordinated to the claim of the lender. A subordination
agreement could very well be a pre-requisite for obtaining a loan
in these situations.38
The use of subordination agreements is very common in an
"insider transaction." 4 A typical case is that of a small businessman who has incorporated his business and holds a security
interest in the assets of the corporation. Before a lending institution will make any loans to the corporation it will demand
that the businessman subordinate his interests. The likelihood in
this case is that the insolvency of the common debtor will also
result in the insolvency of the businessman.8 5
Although no judicial decision has clarified the role of the
subordination agreement under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is evident that perfecting any interest created
by the subordination agreement by filing a financial statement
as required by section 10.9-402 of the South Carolina Code, is
not the practical answer. However, Pioneer-CafeteriaFoods,
Limited v. Mack 6 indicates that the subordination agreement
will not affect third parties unless they have notice of the agreement. Therefore, the best conclusion under the existing law is
really no conclusion at all. The individual creditor must make a
decision based on his need for notice to third parties versus a
simple contractual priority. Under the existing law, filing a
financial statement would vitiate the problem of notice to other
creditors, although this may not be a practical solution to the
problem.
B. Sureties
Another problem which arises under the application of Article
9 of the Code is whether or not the surety for the performance
32. FuNK, supra note 9, at 84.

33. 2 G. GILoP, suPra note 11, at 984.
34. COOGAx, supra note 14, at 2356.

35. See Pioneer-Cafeteria Foods, Ltd. v. Mack, 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965).
36. 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965).
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of a contract or for payment of the labor or materialmen under
a contract must file a financing statement in order to take
priority over creditors of the surety's obligor. This problem also
arises under the application of section 10.9-102 of the South
Carolina Code. If the suretyship agreement is a security transaction then the requirements of Article 9 must be complied with
in order that the surety have his desired priority.
The problem usually comes up in the following context. 37 The
contractor enters into an agreement with an obligor to perform a
certain contract. The contract requires a surety bond and calls
for the obligor to make periodic payments to the contractor as
the performance of the contract progresses. As part of the surety
agreement the surety takes an assignment from the contractor
for moneys due and moneys to become due under the contract to
be paid to the surety if the surety must pay under his bond.
The contractor borrows money from a lending institution in
order to begin performance on the contract. The lending institution also takes an assignment of moneys due and to become due
on the contract. As part of the original contract, the obligor
makes periodic payments directly to the lending institution
where the payment is applied to the loan.
The problem arises when the contractor defaults and the surety
must pay the materialmen and the laborers as well as have the
job completed. The surety then seeks to recover the money he
has paid from the bank or from the obligor depending on
whether the obligor has made his payment or not. On United
States Government contracts a further contest arises between the
bank and the surety for the 10 percent retainage which is withheld from the contractor pending acceptance of the finished job.
There is no doubt that the lending institution must file in
order to protect its priority in the assignment. 8 If the assignment of the contract right does not transfer a significant part of
the overall rights under the contract, then filing will not be
89

required.

It would appear from a general reading of section 9-102 of the
Code that the surety must likewise file to protect his assignment.
In United States v. Fleetwood & Company,40 the court, confronted with a conflict between the trustee in bankruptcy of
37. 2 G. GILMox, supra note 11, at 947.
38. S.C. CODE Aun. § 10.9-102(2) (1966).
39. Id. § 10.9-302(1)(e).
40. 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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a contractor and the surety who had to perform the contract
when the contractor became insolvent, held that the surety must
assume a position with the general creditors. The reason that the
court did not favor the surety was because the surety did not
file his suretyship agreement in conformity with Pennsylvania
law. Pennsylvania had at that time adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
However, in 1965, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Jacobs v. Northeastern Corporation,4 ' held that sureties were
not required to file under the Uniform Commercial Code in
order to achieve a priority in the moneys due under a contract if
the surety has had to pay. The court gave two important reasons
for this result. First of all, a surety agreement is not designed
to protect creditors. It is designed to insure the performance of
the contract and, as such, protects the obligor of the contract.
Therefore, the court felt that it was not a security agreement
within the contemplation of the drafters of section 9-102 of the
42
Uniform Commercial Code.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the court held that
the surety's right to reimbursement was not a matter of contract
right but was a right created by equity. The surety would be
entitled to reimbursement under principles of subrogation even
if the right was not in the contract. If the right to receive the
funds due under the contract had arisen as a matter of subrogation, even if the right was also articulated in the contract, the
Uniform Commercial Code would not require it to be perfected. 43
The logic of this conclusion is sound. If the right to subrogation
was not spelled out in the contract, there would have been no
requirement to file. Therefore, the mere fact that the contract
spells out the right should not defeat the surety's subrogation
rights.
The Jacobs case is the first state decision which has applied
the Uniform Commercial Code to the surety problem. However,
it is not the first case to apply the subrogation principle to
award the surety a priority over the claims of other creditors of
the contractor. In Pearlmanv. Reliance Corporation,44 the surety paid the materialmen and laborers the amount they were due.
In so doing, the court held that the surety was subrogated to
41. 416 Pa. 417, 206 A2d 49 (1965).
42. Id. at 427-28, 206 A.2d at 54.

43. Id. at 429, 206 A2d at 55.
44. 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
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their right to receive compensation for their work. By asserting
their common law lien on the property, the surety was successful
in claiming the amount due on the contract.
Since the Jacobs case will not be binding upon other state
courts when they are confronted with the same question, it is
important to point out the arguments both pro and con with
respect to the question of whether the surety must file his agreement. The first argument is that when a surety enters a surety
agreement he is assuming a contingent liability to complete the
contract.48

Since South Carolina Code section 10.9-102 spe-

cifically applies to a security interest created by contract that is, the security that the contract will be performed, as
well as the security that the surety gets by his rights to an
assignment-it is felt that the surety agreement comes within
the coverage of the Code. 46 The second argument is that this
agreement demonstrates an obvious intention to give a security
interest. Any transaction which is intended to create a security
interest is clearly within the coverage of the Code. 47 However,
in light of the Jacobs decision, these arguments are very weak.
One thing is fairly certain. If the surety does file his contract,
then he will be entitled to the priority he receives by filing.
However, his right to subrogation appears to be sufficient to
protect his desire for priority.
C. Lease of PersonaZ Property with a Rigd of Purchase
Section 10.1-201 (37) of the South Carolina Code states that
unless a lease is intended as security, a reservation of title thereunder is not a "security interest." This section further states
that whether a lease is intended to be security is to be determined
by the facts of each case, but points out that the mere existence
of an option to purchase the chattel does not of itself raise the
presumption that the lease is intended as security even if no
additional consideration is required. Accordingly, the absence
of an option to purchase does not necessarily make the lease a
true lease and not a security instrument. 48
The problem in the area of leasing agreements is to determine
when the particular leasing agreement will be creating "a secur45. 2 G. GIrztorE, supra note 11, at 974.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-102(2) (1966).
47. Id. § 10.9-102(1) (a).
48. 1 G. GILMORE, mora note 11, at 338; S.C.

(1966).
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ity interest" which must be perfected under the provisions of
Article 9 of the Code. 49 For example, if a piece of equipment
has a useful life of three years, at the end of which the equipment has little or no remaining value, and the lessee agrees to
pay the equivalent of the purchase price (less salvage value),
this could be deemed an arrangement intended for security.
This might be true even if there were no option to purchase the
equipment and even if the lease provided that the lessor would
retake the goods at the termination of the lease.60 The argument
in this situation is that the lessee was in reality purchasing the
equipment but allowing the lessor to hold the title to secure the
purchase price.
However, if the lease had provided that the lessee could terminate the arrangement at any time during the three year period,
there is little doubt that the agreement would be a lease agreement not intended as security.r1 If the arrangement is a true
lease, it is not subject to the provisions of Article 9 of the Code.5 2
Although the Code sets out no guidelines which may be used
to determine whether or not the lease arrangement is intended as
security, there are several tests which may be used to ascertain
the status of a particular leasing agreement. First of all, if the
parties themselves intend to create a security device, then it is
apparent that the particular device is a security instrument.
Secondly, if the rent on the equipment is to be applied to the
purchase price in a disproportionate amount, then the courts
may feel that this is in reality a conditional sale of the chattel
with the title being retained in the seller (the lessor). In United
Rental Equipment Company v. Potts and CalZahan Contracting
Company,53 the lessee of an air compressor suffered a judgment
against him and the compressor was sold at a sheriff's sale to
satisfy the judgment. The lease provided that the lessee could
purchase the compressor and 85 percent of the rental payments
would be applied to the purchase price. The lessor sought to have
the compressor returned to him from the purchaser at the sheriff's
sale. The court, looking to the facts and circumstances of the
case, decided that the lease agreement was an unrecorded security
instrument and invalid as to subsequent purchasers or creditors
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-102 (1966).

50. 1 G. Giu.oa, supra note 11, at 339.
51. Id. at 339-40.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-102(2) (1966).

53. 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963).
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under Maryland law. The court stated that if the security interest is intended, then the least must be recorded. Thus under the
Uniform Commercial Code, recordation of this type of lease
would be necessary. The key fact in this case was that the lessee
could apply 85 percent of the rental payments to the purchase
price.
A third test which may be used to ascertain whether or not
the lease agreement is a "security agreement" or a bona fide
lease agreement is to look at the agreement itself. In the case of
Alban Tractor Company v. State Tax Commission," the court
found that the "lessor" of the chattel was in reality the holder
of a "security interest" for the following reasons: (1) a commission had been paid to a salesman who had handled the transaction; (2) the lessor had reported the transaction as a sale for
purposes of income taxation; (3) no depreciation was taken on
the goods by the lessor; (4) the lease was recorded; (5) the rent
on the machinery was disproportionate to the useful life of the
equipment and to its value. In this case the Maryland Tax Commission was seeking to tax the lessor as the owner of the machinery. The intention of the parties was found to be a security
interest created rather than a lease agreement.
Whether or not a leasing agreement comes within the provisions of Article 9 is more a question of fact than law. However,
the above considerations will enable the practicing attorney to
be aware of the problem and take steps to protect the agreement
if it is intended as security and take steps to assure that no
security agreement is created when none is intended.
D. Conclusion
If a problem arises with regard to any of the three areas previously covered, extra care must be used to ascertain whether
or not the provisions of Article 9 of the Code will be applicable.
The important consideration is the intention of the parties. This
is the controlling factor under the Code.
III.

PARTIAL COVRAm

E UNDqm

AmTiorm 9

There are several other areas which are only partially covered
by Article 9. One of the areas deals with the effect of non-consensual liens versus the secured party. This area is of particular
importance to the practicing attorney since it specifically re54. 219 Md. 593, 150 A.2d 456 (1959).
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verses the priority of certain statutory and common law liens
when they are in conflict with a recorded security instrument.
Other areas discussed below are N"ational Filing Systems and
South Carolina Certificate of Title laws.
A. Non-conenual Liens"
South Carolina Code Section 10.9-310 provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business
furnishes services or materials with respect to goods subject
to a security interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of
such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected security
interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly
provides otherwise. 56
The purpose of this section is to give priority to liens created
by statute or by rules of law where the lien arises from work
which enhances or preserves the value of the collateral although
a security interest in the collateral has been perfected. 57 However, the drafters of the Code left the priority question of nonconsensual liens versus the secured party as a matter of local
legislative policy by making an exception to section 9-310. If
the lien is created by statute and the statute expressly provides
that the lien will not be superior to the security interest, then
the non-consensual lien will not take priority. 8
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in
South Carolina, the policy was to favor the perfected security
interest or the recorded chattel mortgage over non-consensual
liens unless the statute expressly gave the lien a priority. 9 The
South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that statutes creating
non-consensual liens only provided a method of enforcing the
common law lien. Unless the statute expressly gave the common
0
law lien a priority, the perfected security interest took priority.6
55. Non-consensual liens may be defined as the interest in particular goods

which arise by operation of law and without the consent of the "owner" of the
goods.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-310 (1966).
57. Id. § 10.9-310; UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 9-310, Comments 1.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-310 (1966).

59. R. H. Nesbitt Auto Co. v. Wtitlock, 113 S.C. 519, 101 S.E. 822 (1920).
60. R. H. Nesbitt Auto Co. v. Whitlock, 113 S.C. 519, 101 S.E. 822 (1920).

Compare, Layton v. Flowers, 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E2d 247 (1964).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

13

South
Carolina
Law Review,
19, Iss. 5 [1967],
Art. 219
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REvIEw
[Vol.

There are several strong arguments for the Code policy of
favoring the lien over the security interest within the limits of
section 10.9-310 of the South Carolina Code. As a matter of
simple economics, it is good policy to encourage the repair of
property. Not only does this enhance the value of the collateral
of the loan, it also encourages the owner of the property to get
the maximum utility out of his property. Encouraging repairs
also creates an entire scope of job opportunities in the economy.
If the repairman is assured of payment by the reason of having
a lien on the goods he repairs, and has the additional advantage
of having a priority of payment, this economic policy of encouraging repairs will be advanced.
One theory for giving the repairman or the person who "furnishes services or materials with respect to goods" a priority is
the waiver or consent theory.6 1 This concept is based on a legal
fiction which supposes that the secured party impliedly consents
to repairs which enhance the value of the collateral.62 This
theory has been strengthened by such language in the security
agreements as "the mortgagor agrees to keep the collateral in
good repair" as a condition of the agreement.6 3 The agency
theory is basically the same. Several courts have found that the
mortgagor was the "agent" of the mortgagee when authorizing
4
repairs.
The application of section 10.9-310 is not so simple as first
meets the eye. In order to ascertain the priority of a particular
statutory or common law lien versus a particular security interest several tests should be utilized.
First of all, the goods must be in the possession of the person
who has furnished the goods and services.6 5 This requirement of
a possessory lien is perhaps the greatest limitation to the scope
of section 9-310. The unanswered question in this area is whether
or not an interpretation of this section will result in a lienor out
of possession being subordinate to the secured party, whereas
the identical lienor in possession would have priority.6 Under
pre-code law most service or materials liens were possessory. The
lien was lost by a voluntary parting of possession of the
61. 2 G.Giuiom, supra note 11, at 879.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id., supra note 11, at 879 n.5.
Id., supra note 11, at 879.
Id.
S.C. CoDE AwN. § 10.9-310 (1966).
2 G. G m!oRE, supra note 11, at 888.
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chattel to which the lien attached. 67 If, however, the owner of
the goods takes possession of his chattel without the knowledge
or consent of the artisan who has the lien, the artisan does not
lose his lien. Furthermore, the artisan is entitled to have the
chattel returned to his possession.6 8 There is no reason to doubt
that these rules of possession will apply under the Code.
An even more difficult question arises where the lienor may
protect his lien by recordation or filing. If the lienor files his
lien while in possession of the chattel and then surrenders possession, he will no longer be a lienor in possession.0 9 If surrendering possession reverses the priorities (thus subordinating the
lien to the perfected security interest), the lienor may find himself the preferred party one day and the subordinated party the
70
next day.
There is a simple explanation for the possessory requirement.
The Codes policy of disfavoring the secret or hidden lien on
property is enhanced by the requirement that the artisan have
possession of the chattel. Once the chattel is returned to its
"owner" a purchaser of the chattel would have no reason to
believe that an artisan's lien was encumbering the property.
The following sections of the South Carolina Code do create
liens in favor of the person providing materials or services where
the person is likewise in possession of the chattel. All of these
sections are silent as to priority, therefore, section 10.9-310 of
the Code will accord them priority. South Carolina Code section
45-554.1 gives a lien to a stable or kennel keeper for the cost of
care on the animal that has been kept ;71 section 45-555 gives a
lien to persons who perform work on textiles for the charges for
the labor on such textiles ;72 section 45-557 gives a lien to laundries on clothes left for any cleaning, repair, etc., for the charges
due on such work;73 and section 45-550 grants a lien to garage74
men and mechanics for repair and storage charges on goods.
67. Johnson v. Parker, 4 S.C. 1 (1817).
68. Bouknight v. Headden, 188 S.C. 300, 199 S.E.2d 315 (1938).
69. While none of the lien statutes found in Article 45 of the Code of Laws

of South Carolina, expressly provide for recording the lien created therein,

S.C. CoDE ANN. § 60-101 (1962) indicates that recording must be accomplished
to protect the lienor's priority against subsequent purchasers or creditors.
Contra, Layton v. Flowers, 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E.2d 247 (1964).
70. 2 G. GrLmORE, supra note 11, at 888.

71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-554.1 (1962).
72. Id. § 45-555.

73. Id. § 45-557.
74. Id. § 45-550.
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The following sections of the South Carolina Code provide for
subordination or priority and would continue in effect because
of the language of section 10.9-310 "unless the lien is statutory
and the statute expressly provides otherwise". 5 Section 45-301
grants a lien to laborers, sub-contractors, and materialmen on
the money received by the building contractor for a specific
job ;70 section 45-351 gives a lien on ships and materials used in
the construction and repair of ships to the laborers and material-

men involved in the construction or repair; 7 7 section 45-505
gives a lien on chattels supplied for agricultural uses ;78 and section 45-451 gives miners and employees of manufacturing concerns a lien on the output or production for unpaid wages or
salaries.70
Once it has been ascertained whether or not a particular lien
meets the possessory lien test, then the second test must be
applied. If the statute which creates the lien has expressly provided for priority or for subordination, then the lien takes
priority or is subordinated regardless of case decisions which
would make the lien subordinate to a perfected security interest.80

This is a very important consideration for the practicing
attorney for it is in this area of the law that section 10.9-310
reverses the existing South Carolina law. Suppose that on June
1, 1966, Buyer purchases an automobile from Seller Auto Dealer.
Buyer makes a substantial down payment on the purchase and
gives Seller a security instrument for the balance. Seller transfers the instrument to First Bank on June 3, 1966, and First
Bank perfects its security interest in the instrument. On October
10, 1966, Buyer takes the automobile to Repairman to have work
done on the transmission. The repair bill is $200. Buyer then
becomes insolvent and cannot pay First Bank or Repairman.
Under the doctrine announced in R. H. Nesbitt Auto Company
v. lVhitlocl, 81 Repairman, even though he has a possessory repairman's lien created by common law and recognized by statute,
would be subordinate to the perfected security interest of First
75. Id. § 10.9-310 (1966).
76. Id. § 45-301.
77. Id. § 45-351.
78. Id. § 45-505.

79. Id. § 45-451.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-310 (1966).
81. 113 S.C. 519, 101 S.E. 822 (1920).
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Bank. The court in Nesbitt held that the statute recognizing the
lien only provided for a method of enforcing the common law
repairman priority since the statute
lien and did not give the
82
priority.
to
was silent as
Under section 10.9-310 of the South Carolina Code, if the
statute is silent as to priority, then the lienor will prevail. This
clearly overrules the Nesbitt case.
The third test which must be applied to ascertain the applicability of section 9-310 is that the lienor must have furnished the
83
services or materials in the "ordinary course of business."
This requirement should be equated as being "tantamount to a
requirement of good faith." 4 The notion that a good faith
transaction is essential to conduct being in the "ordinary course
of business" is found in section 9-203 which states in essence that
"every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." s3 The good faith
or "ordinary course of business" requirement implies a lesser
standard than fraud and could give the court an opportunity to
deny or reduce the priority of the lien if the court feels that the
lienor may have been less than "honest in fact"'8 6 in the trans87
action.
As was stated earlier, non-consensual liens are only partially
within the scope of Article 9 coverage. The application of the
repairman's lien or the artisan's lien illustrates the coverage
aspect of Article 9. One of the best illustrations of the noncoverage aspect of the Article is the application of the landlord's
lien versus the secured party. Code section 9-104 states that "this
article does not apply . . . (b) to a landlord's lien."88 Therefore, the rule of South Carolina Code section 45-155 will still
be applicable. This section gives the mortgagee of the personal
property located on the premises superior rights. The landlord
has an option of paying off the mortgage and then having the
amount apply as part of the distraint. This section is not
affected by section 9-310.
82. Id. at 521, 101 S.E. at 822.
83. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.9-310 (1962).
84. 2 G. GiLMoRE, supra note 11, at 888.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-203 (1966).

86. Id. § 10.1-201(19).
87. 2 G. GiLmopE, supra note 11, at 888.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-104 (1966).
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Perhaps the most important question raised by section 9-310
is its effect on South Carolina Code section 45-551. This section
creates a lien on a motor vehicle for damages resulting from the
negligent operation of the motor vehicle. This section will not be
affected by section 9-310 nor will the cases which have extended
the statutory priority of this lien over bona fide purchasers of
the vehicle without notice of the lien.
B. National Filing Bystems
There are many commercial transactions which are within the
scope of Article 9 of the Code with respect to the creation of a
security interest, priority in the proceeds after sale of the collateral, priority on default of the debt, and the other rules
governing default and sale of the collateral. However, Article 9
does not require that its filing provisions be complied with in
order to perfect the security interest created.
South Carolina Code section 10.9-302(3) (a) provides that
the filing provisions of Article 9 do not apply to "a security
interest in property subject to a statute of the United States
which provides for a national registration or filing of all security interests in such property." 9 Therefore, if particular property is subject to statutes of the United States, the secured party
is well advised to consult the individual statutes to ascertain if
there exists a national filing system. Illustrative of this requirement are the federal statutes requiring national filing of assignments of patents and copyrights.9 0 Security interests in aircrafts, railroads, and ships all require national filing.
An application of this provision can create problems as is illustrated by the Assignment of Claims Act of 1910.91 This act
requires that any assignment of claims must be reported to the
contracting and disbursing officers of the United States before
the United States is bound by the assignment of claims against
it. This act did not establish a filing system per se although it
can be argued that the requirement that notice be given the
United States implies a filing with the United States. The
official comments to section 9-302(3) (a) of the Uniform Coin89. Id. § 10.9-302(3) (a).
90. 17 U.S.C. §§ 28, 30 (1964).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss5/2

18

1967]

et al.: Scope and Coverage of Article 9

ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

699

mercial Code advise that the assignee of a claim against the
92
United States must file under Article 9 in order to be protected.
C. Certificate of Tit7e Laws
South Carolina Code section 10.9-302(3) (b) provides:
The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a
security interest in property subject to a statute of this state
which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in
such property, including, but not limited to the filing provisions of Section 60-252, Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1962, for a security interest in property of any description
or any interest therein created by mortgage made by a railroad company as defined in Section 58-852 Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1962.98
This section subordinates the filing requirements of Article 9
to the South Carolina Certificate of Title Laws if notation is
required to be placed on the certificate of title and if the certificate of title is the exclusive method of perfecting the security
interest. It must be remembered that Article 9 does extend to
all other aspects of the transaction.

92. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.9-302 (1962); UmrFoRm
Comment 8.
93. Id. § 10.9-302(3) (b).
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